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W Scholtz* 
1 Introduction 
The launching of Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 was initiated on the basis 
of Security Council Resolution 678 of 1990. This action was characterized by agreement 
amongst various members of the United Nations (UN) and the question of the legality of 
this operation was not really in dispute. Subsequent armed attacks by especially the 
United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) against Iraq has resulted 
in disagreement regarding the legality of these actions.1
Gross violations of human rights in Kosovo have lead to armed intervention in 1999, 
which has been coined "humanitarian intervention" by various international lawyers. This 
concept has also sparked a debate regarding the legality of the notion in terms of 
international public law.
  
2 It is frequently asked if this concept complies with the jus ad 
bellum.3 The legality of the use of armed force against Afghanistan is also debatable.4
The latter examples of the usage of armed force differ in nature. The Kosovo incident 
relates to the issue of humanitarian intervention, the armed attack on Afghanistan was 
based on a form of self-defence while Iraq was attacked on the ground of pre-emptive 
defence. Although these forms of the application of armed force are very different in 
terms of grounds of justification, they do raise difficult questions regarding the 
 
The disagreement regarding the use of force against Iraq reached an all time high when 
mainly the USA, UK and Australian forces attacked Iraq in 2003. These attacks resulted 
in international resistance.  
                                                 
* BA cum laude LLB (PU for CHE), D JUR (University of Leyden), Associate Professor at the North- 
West University (Potchefstroom Campus). I would like to thank Professor A Puttler for comments on 
a previous draft. All errors or omissions, however, remain my sole responsibility.  
1  Gray 2002 EJIL 1-19.  
2  See Gazzini 2002 EJIL 391-435. 
3  It is not the intention of this article to deal with issues regarding the jus in bello.  
4  See for instance editorial comments 2001 AJIL 833. 
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application of the jus ad bellum and potential amendments to these rules in international 
public law.  
It accordingly is the main purpose of this article to establish what the effects of these 
instances of the use of armed force are on the jus ad bellum. General rules pertaining to 
the use of force will be briefly sketched in the first part of this article. It is not the intent 
of the author to provide an extensive analysis in this regard as the application of the jus 
ad bellum in relation to the examples of the use of force will clarify various aspects of the 
general rules. The notion and legality of humanitarian intervention will subsequently 
receive attention in paragraph 3. The attacks on Afghanistan will briefly receive attention 
in paragraph 4 as to ascertain whether these attacks were legal in terms of international 
public law. Paragraph 5 of this article will focus on the legality of the attack on Iraq. A 
conclusion regarding the effects of these conflicts in relation to the jus ad bellum will be 
drawn from these examples.  
 
2  The use of force in terms of international law  
Article 2(4)5 of the Charter of the United Nations6 contains the basic prohibition on the 
use of force7 in international relations.8 The UN Charter requires that disputes be settled 
by peaceful means.9
                                                 
5  See for an extensive commentary on a 2(4): Randelzhofer The Charter 114-136.  
6  Hereinafter the UN Charter.  
7  The meaning of the term "force" in the text is ambiguous. The developing countries support a wider 
approach whereby all types of coercion are implied, such as physical, economical, political and 
psychological coercion. This interpretation of "force" is of course resisted by Western states. The 
prevailing view does not support the claims of the developing countries. Randelzhofer The Charter 
118.  
8   This provision reads that: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."  
9  A 2(3).  
 Article 1(1) reads that the first purpose of the UN is to maintain 
international peace and security and to prevent threats of peace. The use of unilateral 
force will therefore contravene the principles of the Charter. Article 51 and chapter VII 
contains the two exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force as embodied in article 
2(4). Article 51 makes provision for the right of individual or collective self-defence in 
the instance of an armed attack. A state may engage the right of self-defence until the 
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Security Council has taken action. The measures taken in terms of self-defence must be 
immediately reported to the Security Council. It is interesting to note that recourse to 
self-defence is limited due to the fact that it can only be applicable in the instance of an 
armed attack. Chapter VII contains the second exception to article 2(4) as it provides for 
the use of force to counter the threats and breaches of international peace and security as 
well as acts of aggression, in the form of administering economic and/or military 
sanctions or authorizing collective military action. Article 42 enables the Security 
Council to impose military sanctions in order to maintain or restore international peace. 
 
3  The use of armed force for humanitarian reasons  
3.1  Introduction  
It is not the intention of this article to focus on the history of the Kosovo crisis as other 
authors have done this in detail.10 It would suffice to briefly focus on the developments 
that lead to the NATO intervention. The escalating conflict between Kosovar Albanians 
and ethnic Serbs resulted in the outbreak of a civil war. At the end of 1998 Serb-forces 
continued to build up in Kosovo and atrocities were being committed against Albanians. 
Two rounds of peace talks between representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) and the Kosovar Albanians had failed and the FRY had refused to sign the 
American-drafted Rambouillet agreement. NATO subsequently carried out air strikes 
against the FRY. The Security Council did not provide authorization for the aerial 
campaigns of NATO in Kosovo and the actions of NATO do not constitute collective 
self-defence.11
                                                 
10  See Gazzini 2002 EJIL 391-435; Cohn 2002 IJSL 79-106; Sulyok 2000 Acta Juridica Hungarica 79-
109; Krisch 2002 EJIL 323-335; Kritisiotis 2000 ICLQ 330-359. 
 The question accordingly arises whether article 2(4) makes provision for 
the use of force in instances other than self-defence and authorization by the Security 
Council. Is the use of force for humanitarian ends justified? May force therefore be used 
to prevent or suppress atrocities and massive violations of human rights as in the case of 
Kosovo? The events that took place in 1998-1999 in Kosovo have placed a great deal of 
11  Kirgis http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh30.htm 8 Aug. See also Cassese 1999 EJIL 23. Some 
international lawyers are of the view that NATO is not a regional agency as provided for in ch VIII, 
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focus on the concept of "humanitarian intervention" and it compelled international 
lawyers to revisit this notion.12 This concept has received a great deal of attention and has 
been the source of a lively debate in the field of international public law.13 The term 
"humanitarian intervention" is used where a state or several states use armed force against 
another state in order to enforce and protect human rights.14 The UN Charter does not 
explicitly deal with humanitarian intervention. The fact that the Security Council has the 
power to authorize coercive intervention does not mean that this authority is easily 
invoked.15 The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.16 Article 39 of the UN Charter states that the Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression and it can take measures involving the use of force in response. The effect of 
article 27(3) of the UN Charter is that a Security Council Resolution to authorize 
intervention is subject to the consent of any of the five permanent members. A single 
permanent member can therefore prevent the authorization of humanitarian 
intervention.17 The authority also requires an affirmative vote by nine members of the 
fifteen Council members. This procedure has proved not to be efficacious.18 An example 
of this is the instance where China vetoed a draft resolution that was aimed at the 
extension of the presence of peacekeeping forces in Macedonia for another six months. 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK and the USA 
sponsored the draft resolution.19
                                                                                                                                                 
but a military alliance. It is not the intention of this article to scrutinize these arguments. See Falk 
http://
 Thirteen states voted in favour of this resolution while 
Russia abstained from voting. The requirements in article 27(3) may lead to a situation 
where a state or group of states uses force to secure human rights in other states in the 
absence of the authorization of the Security Council.  
It is accordingly important to dissect the various possible justifications that may exist for 
the usage of force on the basis of humanitarian intervention.  
www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 7 Jun; Gazzini 2002 EJIL 430ff. 
12  Henkin http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 1 Jun. 
13  Eg Cohn 2002 IJSL 79-106; Krisch 2002 EJIL 323-335; Kritisiotis 2000 ICLQ 330-359.  
14  Doehring Völkerrecht 431. 
15  The power to authorize an intervention can originate from a 42 of the UN Charter. 
16  A 12 and 24 of the UN Charter.  
17  Henkin http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 2.  
18  Charney http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 1 Aug. Unanimity has rarely been reached or where it 
was reached, it was not enforced. Randelzhofer The Charter 126.  
19  See Press Release http://www.maknews.com/html/articles/un_res_1371.htm 3 Jul.  
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3.2  Textual interpretation of article 2(4) of the UN Charter  
Certain scholars argue that article 2(4) does not prohibit unilateral force in general, but 
force against the political independence and territorial integrity of a state or recourse to 
force inconsistent with the principles of the UN Charter.20 In terms of this argument the 
use of force to protect human rights is not directed against the political independence and 
territorial integrity of a state and it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter as 
respect for human rights is one of the aims thereof.21 The use of force is accordingly 
justified to end atrocities and large-scale deprivation of life and humanitarian intervention 
does not violate article 2(4). This argument is, however, flawed and cannot be accepted.22 
The terms "territorial integrity" and "political independence" do not restrict the scope of 
the prohibition of the use of force and cover any kind of transboundary use of armed 
force.23 Most forms of the implementation of armed force therefore falls under the first 
two prohibitions and any other forms are covered by the catch-all phrase which outlaws 
the threat or the use of force "in any matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations". It is after all the main purpose of the UN Charter to ensure the maintenance of 
peace.24
The international legal system has undergone changes since the founding of the UN. 
State sovereignty was to a great extent the center of attention when the Charter came 
into force.
 
3.3  The role of the sovereignty of states  
25 Article 2(7) contains a reference to the state sovereignty of members of 
the UN.26 Reisman27
None of us who are compelled to ask hard questions about the lawfulness of the 
Kosovo action is a consistent strict constructionist of the Charter. After all, who 
 is of the opinion that:   
                                                 
20  See Byers 2002 EJIL 26. 
21  Doehring Völkerrecht 433. 
22  See also Schachter International Law 118. 
23  Randelzhofer The Charter 123.  
24  A 1(1) of the UN Charter. 
25  Charney http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 1 Aug: NATO's Campaign. 
26  A 2(7) states that: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 
27  Reisman http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 9 Jun.  
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amongst us insists on a textual interpretation of article 2(7)? But we are all 
stricter when it comes to reading article 2(4). 
It is accordingly reasoned that the flexible interpretation of article 2(7) has an effect on 
article 2(4). The basis for this argument is that the defense of domestic jurisdiction in 
terms of sovereignty cannot be used as an excuse for human rights violations.28
State sovereignty does not entail that a state as a member of the international community 
is free from certain responsibilities to its own citizens and to other members of the 
international community.
 The right 
to violate human rights in a gross fashion is therefore removed from the sphere of 
political independence. It is argued that the UN Charter cannot be changed without 
resulting in adjustments in other parts of the Charter. The argument furthermore entails 
that the inefficiency of the procedures of the Security Council results in a lack of action 
where humanitarian intervention is needed and it is not practical that the council  has the 
exclusive power to decide in these circumstances which course of action must be 
undertaken. The question accordingly arises whether this argument can find support?  
29 The international dimension to various activities, such as 
transboundary pollution, has lead to the development of international regulations to 
ensure the effective management of such issues.30 This leads to a situation where the 
notion of sovereignty is changing in those areas, which were considered to be within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of States. This indeed allows for a more flexible approach 
regarding the interpretation of article 2(7). The notion of state sovereignty must be 
viewed in the context of the three sets of values that form the basis for inter-state 
relations: peace,31 human rights32 and self-determination.33
                                                 
28  See also Falk http://
 They constitute a hierarchy of 
values in the sense that peace must always be the ultimate purpose where a conflict arises 
between the values. These values can be interdependent in various instances. The 
www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 7 Jun. It must be kept in mind that in the instance of 
Kosovo, it was not the UN that intervened in the domestic jurisdiction of another state. The argument 
is, however, relevant to the question whether a 2(4) has been changed through developments in the 
interpretation of a 2(7).  
29  Sovereignty entails that a distinction is made between two elements: the state vested with rights and 
obligations on the one hand and the state, which is a sovereign creator of law in the international 
public law arena. Strydom 1989 JJS 36.  
30  Two factors are seen to be most important regarding the eroding of state sovereignty: global economic 
integration and the detrimental human impact on the environment. Lee 
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Poli/PoliLee.htm 14 Jun. 
31  A 1(1) of the Charter. 
32  See a 1(3) of the Charter. 
33  See a 1(2) of the Charter. 
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existence of peace may be dependent on the adherence to the protection of international 
human rights. The fact that peace is the highest value does not mitigate the importance of 
the other values as well as the role of these values in the promotion of peace.34 Articles 
55 and 56 of the UN Charter implore all members to take action to promote respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. The broad acceptance 
of human rights also has an influence on the concept of state sovereignty.35 Reliance on 
state sovereignty in terms of article 2(7) can no longer serve as a reason for non-
intervention where gross violations of human rights are committed. Sovereignty therefore 
entails, in the field of human rights, that the power of the state must be restricted and that 
the state has an obligation in this regard to protect the human rights of its citizens.36
It is very important to realize that the acceptance of the flexible approach to sovereignty, 
does not imply that article 2(4) can be interpreted in a way that permits the use of 
unilateral armed force for humanitarian reasons. This will render the content of article 
2(4) meaningless. Articles 2(7) and 2(4) furthermore differ as article 2(4) is a jus cogens 
norm whereas article 2(7) does not have the same status.
 The 
state must furthermore also serve as an agent to protect its citizens from harm from other 
parties, such as third states. The responsible exercise of sovereignty can promote human 
rights just as the irresponsible exercise thereof can be to the disadvantage of human 
rights. 
37 The fact that article 2(7) has 
been given content regarding the implication of sovereignty in relation to the other values 
in the Charter, does not imply that humanitarian intervention in the absence of 
authorization of the Security Council can be accepted.38
                                                 
34  Mertus is of the opinion that to emphasize security without having regard for human rights implies 
that the promotion of peaceful and just societies is sacrificed. Mertus 
http://
 The fact that a state exercises its 
sovereignty in a way that does not pay heed to human rights does not warrant illegal 
unauthorized intervention and a violation of article 2(4).  
www.asil.org/insights/insigh31.htm 7 Jun. 
35  A great deal of agreements pertaining to human rights are in force, such as the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966; 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 1979; Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984: and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child 1989. 
36  Bennoune 2002 EJIL 243-262.  
37  This will be discussed in par 3.4ff. 
38  See for an opposing view: Thürer 2000 Archiv des Völkerrechts 6. 
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3.4  Humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm of customary law   
It has been argued that the use of armed force in Kosovo established the emergence of a 
new customary rule in favour of humanitarian intervention.39 The obligation of states to 
respect human rights is an obligation erga omnes and this implies that any state or a 
collective group of states has the right to take steps, excluding the unilateral use of force, 
to attain such a respect.40 In terms of this argument the resort to unilateral armed force for 
reasons of humanitarian intervention may gradually become justified under strict 
conditions. If a humanitarian intervention rule evolves in the world community, it would 
constitute an exception to the rule of collective enforcement based on the authorization of 
the Security Council. This would then serve as an exception similar to the exception in 
article 51.41 In order to establish whether a rule can be recognized as customary 
international law, the requirements of opinio juris and usus would need to be met.42 In 
this instance these requirements will not be easily met. The G77 group issued an 
unequivocal statement that unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal according to 
international law.43 It would be hard to meet the requirement of usus due to the fact that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is the exception rather than the rule.44 In this regard 
some international scholars argue that only physical acts can be seen as State practice and 
therefore any State, which wants to oppose or support the formation of new customary 
law must act in a decisive manner.45
                                                 
39  Byers 2002 EJIL 27.  
40  Strydom 1988/1989 SAYIL 52ff. The ICJ characterized obligations erga omnes as commitments 
towards the international community as a whole. Par 33 and 34; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Ltd Second Phase, ICJ Reports 1970. Examples of obligations erga omnes may be found in 
general international law as well as treaty law. See also par 40 of the separate opinion of Kooijmans j 
in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) ICJ Reports 2004. 
41  The exceptions would have some commonalities: they would be justified by special circumstances, 
must constitute an extrema ratio, must be strictly limited for the purpose of stopping the atrocities, 
must be proportionate and must yield to collective enforcement under UN authority as soon as 
possible.  
42  See Dugard International Law 24. 
 According to this viewpoint mere statements or 
43  Par 54; Declaration of G77 http://www.nam.gov.za/documentation/southdecl.htm 9 Jun. The 133 
States that issued the declaration consists of Asian States, African States, Latin American States and 
Arab States. 
44  The ICJ in the Nicaragua case stated that: "while the United States might form its own appraisal of 
the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate 
method to monitor or ensure such respect" at par 268; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)(Merits Judgement) ICJ 
Reports 1986. Hereinafter referred to as the Nicaragua case.  
45  Byers 2002 EJIL 30. See for an extensive discussion pertaining to developments in this field: Roberts 
2001 AJIL 757-791. 
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claims would not suffice. This viewpoint tends to give more influence to the powerful 
States in the formation of customary law. Literature in the United States suggests that 
more powerful States matter more regarding the formation of customary law.46
It must furthermore be kept in mind that article 2(4) is a jus cogens norm.
 This 
notion violates the principle of sovereign equality.  
47 This concept 
was codified in the Vienna Convention.48 Article 53 states that a treaty shall be void if it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law as a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.49
A jus cogens norm has the highest hierarchical position among the other norms and 
principles of international law. Jus cogens norms are peremptory and non-derogable.
 The violation of jus cogens norms is a 
violation against the international community as a whole and the use of force against one 
state implies the use of force against all states. It is therefore important to establish if the 
restrictions of the use of force have been changed by other norms of jus cogens. 
50 In 
order to achieve recognition as jus cogens, a norm must be accepted and recognized as a 
peremptory norm by the international community of states as a whole as indicated in 
article 53 of the Vienna Convention.51
In terms of the wording of article 53 a jus cogens norm can be amended by a norm of the 
same nature. Article 64 of the same Convention also makes provision for the emergence 
of a new peremptory norm of general international law. The modification of a jus cogens 
 In the light of the importance of the norms in 
question, such an acceptance and recognition would not be lightly presumed. The fact 
that article 53 refers to the acceptance and recognition by the international community as 
a whole is a strict requirement for the creation of a jus cogens norm.  
                                                 
46  Byers 2002 EJIL 31.  
47  Charney http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 9. See Strydom 1988/1989 SAYIL 44. Originally the 
notion of jus cogens applied only to treaty relationships. Subsequent developments have indicated the 
desire of the international community to apply this notion in a much broader context. Danilenko Law-
Making 213.  
48  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, hereinafter referred to as the Vienna Convention. 
49  It is very controversial whether the concept of jus cogens is applicable outside the domain of treaty 
law. See De Wet Powers of the UN 187. The Charter is also a treaty.  
50  See the discussion in Danilenko Law-Making 219ff.  
51  Danilenko Law-Making 235. 
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norm can only be done via a peremptory law-changing process that does not deviate from 
the original law-making process whereby the original norm was established.52 Any 
modification could therefore only occur if it is sanctioned by a new norm, which is 
accepted and recognized as provided for in article 53 of the Vienna Convention. The 
customary process can therefore not be a suitable mechanism to amend jus cogens norms 
in a treaty due to the fact that acts constituting new practice aimed at modification of such 
a jus cogens rule would be invalid ab initio. The consent of other states not to adhere to 
the existing norm of jus cogens does not change the situation. The modification of an 
existing jus cogens norm in a treaty must take place via a general multilateral treaty that 
embodies a peremptory norm that is in line with article 53. It must furthermore be taken 
into account that it is doubtful that a customary norm in favour of humanitarian 
intervention has emerged. The jus cogens restrictions relating to the recourse to armed 
force were and are not changed by the actions in Kosovo.53
The concept of humanitarian intervention cannot be supported by the existence of a rule 
of customary international law in this regard. The question may therefore be asked 
whether the concept of humanitarian intervention can be justified on other grounds. It 
would be worthwhile to briefly focus on arguments of various scholars in this regard. 
Schachter is of the opinion that it is undesirable to allow a rule of humanitarian 
intervention and that it would be better to acquiesce in a violation that is considered 
necessary and desirable.
  
3.5  Other justifications for humanitarian intervention   
54 Henkin also follows the same line of reasoning and is of the 
opinion that the lesson of Kosovo is that states will first act and then challenge the 
Security Council to terminate the action.55 A permanent member of the council  could by 
means of a veto ensure that such a resolution is not adopted. The Security Council will 
therefore acquiesce in the decision to intervene. Henkin finds support for his statement in 
the adoption of Resolution 1244.56
                                                 
52  Danilenko Law-Making 250.  
 This Resolution seems to ignore the events that took 
place prior to its existence. This Resolution does not condemn the use of force against the 
FRY and indeed does not even make mention of it. It is, however, questionable whether 
53  Concurring, Franck http://www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 12 Jun. 
54   Schachter International Law 126.  
55   Henkin http:// www.asil.org/ajil/kosovo.htm 1 Jun. 
56  Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999. 
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this resolution serves as evidence for the acquiescence of the intervention. It is through 
this resolution that the Security Council took control of the situation in Kosovo and 
addressed urgent matters in terms of a pragmatic approach. This "supposed realist" 
approach of Henkin and Schachter undermines the existence of international public law 
regarding recourse to armed conflict.57
Doehring has defended the notion of humanitarian intervention with an analogous 
application of article 51 of the Charter.
 The fact that ex post facto acceptance of the 
intervention takes place does not change the fact that recourse to armed conflict might 
have been illegal. This pragmatic acceptance of illegality opens up a wide gap for abuse. 
The "supposed realist" approach constitutes an acceptance of the contravention of 
international law "where it is necessary and desirable". States may accordingly choose to 
breach international law in these circumstances. It is clear that danger also exists where 
the contravention of law on the basis of unclear criteria is accepted.  
58 In terms of this concept gross violations of 
human rights give rise to a breach of obligations erga omnes. The argument is that article 
51 finds analogous application and can be used as a justification ground for intervention 
due to the fact that these violations are mostly accompanied by an element of force. 
Doehring further argues that oppressed people have legal subjectivity and that gross 
violations of human rights give rise to a right to self-defence analogous to the right 
contained in article 51. Other States, as carriers of legal subjectivity, can therefore 
provide "emergency help" (Nothilfe) to oppressed individuals. The arguments of 
Doehring are based on moral considerations, which are not supported by international 
law. This is also clear from the statement of Doehring that it would be absurd to accept 
that the Charter prohibits humanitarian intervention where this could save lives.59
                                                 
57  Moore identifies two wrong schools of thought on the subject of jus ad bellum. The "supposed realist" 
school is the group that is of the opinion that international rules are not really enforced and therefore 
not important. They tend to ignore the importance of international public law and the prohibition 
against aggression. The "minimalists" do not focus on the illegality of an attack, but rather curtail the 
right of self-defence through a variety of implausible interpretations of the UN Charter. This group 
also ignores the importance of the role of law in deterring aggression. Moore http://
 The 
analogous application of article 51 cannot be supported, because article 51 should be 
www.fed-
soc.org/Publication/Transcripts/useofforce.htm 10 Jun. 
58  Doehring Völkerrecht 432.  
59  Doehring Völkerrecht 436.  
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interpreted restrictively.60 The prevailing opinion furthermore rules out the use of force 
as a permissible countermeasure in the case of the violation of obligations erga omnes.61
Various authors have tried to draw up conditions under which humanitarian intervention 
can be permissible.
  
62 These criteria cannot, however, transform an illegal intervention 
into a lawful one. Criteria for humanitarian intervention may be useful in the instance 
where the Charter is amended to provide for this concept under strict conditions. 
Established criteria can then serve as conditions, which must be complied with in order to 
constitute humanitarian intervention. It is in this context of interest to focus on the 
deliberations of the Axworthy Commission. This international commission is concerned 
with the question whether and when it is permissible to implement humanitarian 
intervention.63
                                                 
60  Randelzhofer The Charter 677. 
61  Hilpold 2001 EJIL 453.  
62  See for instance: Cassese 1999 EJIL 27; Thürer 2000 Archiv des Völkerrechts 7. 
 The Axworthy Commission has drafted principles and grounds for 
humanitarian intervention, which must ensure that states do not use the concept of 
humanitarian intervention for their own selfish interests. In terms of the principles of the 
Commission, humanitarian intervention may only take place when a high loss of human 
life has already occurred or is feared or where an ethnical cleansing has started or is 
feared. It is furthermore stated that members should pursue authorization through the 
Security Council. The Commission proposes that the five permanent members of the 
Security Council must agree that they will refrain from making use of their veto right to 
impair the approval of a resolution aimed at humanitarian intervention, which is 
supported by the majority of the members. Members must refrain from using their veto 
right where the national interests of members are not affected. In the instances where the 
Security Council refuses a motion for humanitarian intervention this proposal may be 
taken to the General Assembly or measures may be taken in terms of chapter 8 of the 
Charter, provided that subsequent authorization will be sought. This principle opens up 
the possibility for regional organizations to first act in contravention with article 2(4) and 
then to seek retroactive justification for their actions. This is clearly not an optimal 
approach and may lead to abuse. Another problem with these grounds and principles for 
humanitarian intervention is that it may be possible for a powerful state to indicate that 
the requirements for the justification of humanitarian intervention are met and such a 
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state may then pursue its own self-interest. It is also doubtful whether powerful states will 
adhere to the proposed grounds and principles in the instance where they pursue self-
interest. The requirements of a high loss of life and ethnical cleansing can also be 
subjective in nature and states may manipulate this to suit their own needs. Although 
critique may be voiced against the proposals of the Commission, the results of the 
deliberations of this commission may prove to be useful in the event where the Charter 
can be amended to introduce the concept of humanitarian intervention.  
The armed intervention in Kosovo is illegal due to the fact that it is in contravention of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The acceptance of the emergence of a customary rule of 
humanitarian intervention is not supported by evidence. Various concerns furthermore 
exist in this regard. The fear exists that the use of force is once more becoming an 
accepted means of conducting international affairs whereby the interests of a small group 
of powerful states are promoted.64 This development takes place in line with the 
development of a concept of "limited sovereignty" in favour of the more powerful 
states.65
                                                                                                                                                 
63  Williams 2002 Vereinte Nationen Zeitschrift für die VN 10ff. It is not the intention of this article to 
explore the proposals of this Commission in great detail. 
 The arguments contesting the concept of humanitarian intervention highlight the 
dangers that may accompany the introduction of the concept of armed intervention 
without the permission of the Security Council. It is most probable that major powers will 
abuse the notion of humanitarian intervention and apply the will of a collective entity, 
under the supervision of a single superpower, which may be detrimental to the 
individuals in a particular state. It is not without good reason that the restrictions to the 
recourse of armed force are jus cogens. Caution should be applied to ensure that armed 
force is not a resort for a few major powers that decide unilaterally when and where to 
use it. A few state actors should not acquire the privilege to regulate the international 
plane and to rewrite international law as they please. The need to intervene in situations 
where atrocities against humanity are committed has lead to the development of 
arguments that intend to justify the use of unilateral armed force for humanitarian 
purposes. It is clear that most of these arguments are superficial and does not satisfy 
questions regarding the legality of humanitarian intervention. These arguments merely 
reflect a notion of reality that international public law does not provide for unilateral 
64  Köchler http://www.i-p-o.org/koechler-intervention.pdf 20 Jun. 
65  Ibid. 
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humanitarian intervention. It is not useful to construct arguments that are not in line with 
the principles of international public law in order to justify the actions of major powers. 
The morality of these arguments is used as an excuse for the procedural shortcomings of 
the intervention in Kosovo. Morality is also a driving force behind the acceptance of the 
intervention in Kosovo.  
The status quo regarding humanitarian intervention provides the legal scholar with a 
moral dilemma due to the fact that it supposes that gross violations of human rights may 
occur without any intervention where the Security Council has not provided authorization 
due to the differences amongst members. Certain powers may have recourse to armed 
force without permission of the Security Council where atrocities take place. The moral 
inclination to take action must, however, be distinguished from the legal questions 
regarding humanitarian intervention. The restrictions pertaining to armed force are 
necessary to ensure that the major powers do not rewrite international law based on a 
concept of the use of force based on the excuse of humanitarian intervention. This will 
result in anarchy in the field of international law.  
 
4  Military actions in Afghanistan   
4.1  Introduction   
On September 11, 2001, the USA was the victim of attacks carried out by Al Qaeda 
members who crashed two commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center towers, one 
into the Pentagon and another into a field into Shanksville, Pennsylvania.66
                                                 
66  See for an extensive description of the facts: Murphy 2002 AJIL 237ff.  
 On October 7, 
2001, President Bush invoked the United States' inherent right to self-defence and 
ordered U.S. armed forces to initiate action against members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Council of NATO decided that the attack 
against the USA was an action covered by article 5 of the Washington Treaty, whereby 
an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America "shall be 
considered an attack against them all". The use of force in this regard was essentially 
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based on article 51 of the Charter.67 The Security Council has not adopted a resolution 
under chapter VII of the Charter to authorize the use of force.68 The use of armed force 
in this instance is furthermore clearly not a case of humanitarian intervention.69 The 
actions against Afghanistan have accordingly resulted in a debate regarding the legality 
of these actions.70 Various authors have engaged in this debate and it would not be 
meaningful to duplicate these contributions.71
The reliance on article 51 of the Charter for the justification of the attacks against 
Afghanistan implies that the attacks against the USA must have been "armed attacks" as 
provided for in the provision of article 51. The historical context of article 51 of the 
Charter suggests that armed attacks only relate to attacks between states.
 It would suffice for the purpose of this 
article to briefly reflect on the effect of these actions in Afghanistan in relation to the jus 
ad bellum.  
4.2  Justifications for the attacks against Afghanistan   
72 A theological 
reading of article 51, however, supports an interpretation that focuses on the impact of the 
attack rather than the origin of the attack.73 The gravity of the attacks on the USA may 
therefore constitute an "armed attack" if a theological approach of article 51 is followed. 
A second prerequisite is the fact that self-defence in terms of article 51 must be directed 
against the state, which was responsible for the armed attack if the territorial sovereignty 
of that state is infringed. Originally self-defence was only justified where it was directed 
against states and not other entities.74 In the instance of the Afghanistan conflict, Al 
Qaeda was responsible for the attacks against the USA. The actions of the Al Qaeda were 
attributed to the Taliban regime and the state of Afghanistan.75
                                                 
67  Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 211. 
68  See Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001. Resolution 1368 reaffirms the inherent right 
of individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter, while Resolution 1373 
obliges all member states to deny financing, support and safe haven to terrorists. These resolutions did 
not authorize self-defence in terms of ch VII of the Charter. 
69  Ibid. 
70  See for instance editorial comments 2001 AJIL 833. 
 The reason for the attack 
71  See for instance: Franck 2001 95 AJIL 839. See also the contributions of various authors at: 
http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ and http://www.asil.org/terrorind.htm 2 Aug.  
72  This is supported by a 1 of the Definition of Aggression GA Resolution 3314. The ICJ largely equated 
the definition of aggression with the concept of an "armed attack" at Nicaragua case par 195.  
73  See Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 3 Aug. Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 213. See also par 35 of the 
separate opinion of Kooijmans j in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Reports 2004.  
74  Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 19.  
75  Murphy AJIL 245 and 246.  
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of the state of Afghanistan was the fact that Afghanistan supposedly allowed Al Qaeda to 
undertake terrorist attacks against the USA and did not take action to put an end to the 
actions of this entity. This issue raises the question whether the mere harbouring of 
terrorists is sufficient to hold a state accountable for an armed attack. It must be noted in 
this regard that states may incur legal responsibility for tolerating terrorism from its 
territory.76 Even if it can be argued that Afghanistan failed to comply with its obligations 
in terms of international law, this still does not warrant self-defence in terms of article 51. 
State responsibility for harbouring terrorists must be distinguished from state 
responsibility for an armed attack on another state by the same terrorists. The question 
accordingly arises whether Afghanistan can be held responsible for the armed attacks of 
Al Qaeda against the USA. The International Court of Justice adopted the so-called 
"effective control" test, in terms of which a state can be liable for the acts of those over 
whom it has effective control.77 The court held that a high degree of control over a 
military group was necessary and that the control be exercised with respect to the specific 
relevant operation. The mere assistance in the form of the provision of weapons or 
logistical support would not constitute an armed attack. The tolerance of the presence of 
terrorists on a state's territory is an insufficient reason in terms of present international 
law to impute to the host an armed attack of the terrorists.78
                                                 
76  See for instance the Declaration on Principles of International Law GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 
October 1975. This declaration inter alia states that: "Every State has a duty to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in … terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts."  
77  Par 105, 119 and 230; Nicaragua case. 
 The "effective control" test is 
78  Mégret http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 23. See for an opposing view Stahn 2002 ZaoRV 221. Stahn 
is of the view that the "overall control" test as adopted by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the 
Tadic case may be fulfilled in the Afghanistan case. In terms of this test, control required by 
international law may be deemed to exist when a State or a Party to the conflict has a role in 
organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the group, in addition to financing, 
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Par 137; ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic ILM (1999) 1518. In terms of this argument a 9 of the ILC Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, which makes provision for the attribution of non-state actors in failed 
state scenarios, such as Afghanistan is furthermore applicable. It is, however, doubtful that this 
reasoning depicts the requirements in terms of international law. It must be noted that the legal issues 
and factual situation in the Tadic case differed from the Nicaragua case. The issue before the Tribunal 
was that of individual responsibility and the applicable rules of humanitarian international law. It is 
also worthwhile to take notice of the Tehran Hostage case where the Court formulated the 
"subsequent approval" formula in terms of which subsequent approval or endorsement of wrongful 
acts may provide evidence of state responsibility. Par 67; Case Concerning United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) ICJ Report 1980. This test should be 
applied with caution in the instances of a 51 as it related to the responsibility of Iran in terms of the 
Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.  
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not fulfilled in the instance of the Afghanistan case. It seems that in the instance of 
Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had effective control over the Afghanistan regime.79
Although the attacks on the USA were horrific and condemned by most international 
actors, it is a different question whether the armed response of the USA was valid in 
terms of international law. A few problems arise regarding this scenario. The fact that a 
non-state actor instituted the armed attack may be seen as an obstacle to the legitimacy of 
the actions of the USA. In terms of a theological approach it is possible to construct the 
attack as an "armed attack" as required by article 51. A second more problematic issue is 
the question whether the actions of Al Qaeda can be attributed to the de facto regime of 
Afghanistan.
   
80
5  The legality of the use of force against Iraq  
 This is due to the fact that the Taliban was the target of attack in response 
to the terrorist actions against the USA. In this instance the "effective control" test is not 
fulfilled and the acts of Al Qaeda cannot be attributed to the Taliban, which implies that 
article 51 cannot serve as a legal ground for the actions of the USA. The armed attack of 
the USA against Afghanistan was therefore in contravention of article 2(4). 
 
5.1  Authorisation by the Security Council  
In order to determine the legality of the recent attacks on Iraq, it must be established if 
the UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq have authorised the actions of the 
USA and the UK. It must be borne in mind that the Security Council has not passed a 
resolution authorising the use of force since Resolution 67881 was adopted at the start 
of the Gulf War. This resolution authorised Member States "to use all necessary means 
to uphold and implement Resolution 66082
                                                 
79  Mégret
 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and 
 http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ 24.  
80  It must be borne in mind that the territorial sovereignty of a de facto regime must also be respected. 
81  Security Council Resolution 678 of 1990. The ICJ also referred to the gravity of an attack in the 
Nicaragua case and emphasized that an armed attack must be on a greater scale and effects than a 
mere frontier incident. Par 195; Nicaragua case. Resolutions of the Security Council can be found at 
http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm 2 Jun. All resolutions relating to Iraq can also be found at 
http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html 2 Jun. It is impossible to explore all resolutions pertaining to 
Iraq and therefore only the most relevant resolutions will be highlighted. 
82  Security Council Resolution 660 of 1990. 
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to restore international peace and security in the area". The primary purpose of 
Resolution 660 was to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. After the purpose of 
Resolution 678 was served, a cease-fire was embodied in Resolution 68783. Iraq 
accepted the terms contained in the resolution and the provisional cease-fire in 
Resolution 68684 was transformed into a permanent cease-fire.85
Two arguments in relation to the justification of attacks on Iraq in terms of Security 
Council Resolutions have been made. The USA and UK have argued that the failure of 
Iraq to comply with the terms of Resolution 687 has renewed the authorisation to use 
force in terms of Resolution 678.
  
86 The USA for example argued that Iraq had 
breached the cease-fire by its contravention of obligations in terms of Resolutions 687, 
70787, 71588, 115489, 119490 and 120591. The coalition forces therefore used force and 
initiated Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to uphold Resolution 678. Resolution 687 
contains a cease-fire agreement between Iraq and the United Nations that has the sole 
purpose to bring the Gulf War to an end. It furthermore contains requirements that Iraq 
needs to accept. The cease-fire was conditional on the acceptance of these terms. The 
cease-fire came into force due to the fact that Iraq accepted the requirements of the 
cease-fire.92 The general prohibition of force applied again in full and a material 
breach of the requirements of the cease-fire does not give individual members the right 
to use armed force without the authorisation of the Security Council.93
                                                 
83  Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. 
84  Security Council Resolution 686 of 1991. 
85  Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 148. Resolution 687 contains detailed requirements, such as the 
destruction of chemical and biological weapons with a range greater than one hundred and fifty 
kilometres; the setting up of a demilitarised zone; resolving the border dispute between Iraq and 
Kuwait and the continuance of economic sanctions against Iraq.  
86  Gray 2002 EJIL 12. 
87  Security Council Resolution 707 of 1991. 
88  Security Council Resolution 715 of 1995. 
89  Security Council Resolution 1154 of 1998. 
90  Security Council Resolution 1194 of 1998. 
91  Security Council Resolution 1205 of 1998. 
92  Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 149.  
 The Security 
Council is the party to the cease-fire and it must decide whether a material breach has 
occurred regarding the agreement and which type of response is needed. The argument 
of the US ignores the way in which the United Nations takes recourse to chapter VII of 
the Charter where the use of force is required. Limited resources and capacity 
problems restricted the UN to develop an enforcement mechanism against acts of 
W SCHOLTZ   PER/PELJ 2004(7)2 
 
 149/204 
aggression or breaches of peace.94
Another argument states that Security Council Resolutions implicitly authorised the 
use of force where Iraq has contravened its obligations.
 The Security Council therefore needs to rely on its 
members to enforce military sanctions. This is done by way of authorisation through 
resolutions where the Security Council still remains in control. Individual members 
accordingly act under supervision and in terms of the authorisation of the Security 
Council. It would be absurd and contrary to the objectives of the Charter if an 
authorisation implied a permanent mandate for members to unilaterally decide when a 
cease-fire is breached and when force must be used. It is therefore for the Security 
Council to decide whether the contravention of a cease-fire agreement should be 
answered by resuming to the use of force.  
95 This argument has also been 
used to justify Operation Desert Fox when Iraq refused to co-operate with weapons 
inspectors. The UK and USA referred to Resolutions 1154 and 1205 as the basis for 
the justification of their actions. These resolutions did not expressly provide for the 
use of force. The first resolution stated that Iraq must allow unrestricted access to 
weapons inspectors and indicated that a violation of the resolution would have the 
severest consequences for Iraq.96 Resolution 1205 condemned the decision of Iraq not 
to co-operate with the weapons inspectors.97 It was therefore argued that Resolution 
1205 revived the authority to use force contained in Resolution 678. The question is 
whether Resolution 1154 read with Resolution 1205 implicitly authorises the use of 
force. The Namibia Advisory Opinion98
The language of a resolution should be carefully analysed … having regard to 
the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the 
Charter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in 
determining the legal consequences.  
 provides guidance in relation to the 
interpretation of resolutions of the Security Council and states that:  
                                                                                                                                                 
93  Lobel and Ratner 1999 AJIL 144; Murswiek 2003 NJW 1016.  
94  In terms of a 43 of the UN Charter, members were supposed to make forces available to the Security 
Council to ensure that the Security Council could enforce peace measures. This has not occurred. In 
terms of a 106 the implementation of military sanctions is, however, possible in the absence of the 
fulfilment of a 43. Randelzhofer The Charter 127. 
95  Gray 2002 EJIL 11.  
96  Par 3.  
97  Par 1. 
98  Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 278 (1970): Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 1971. 
The court suggested an approach similar to that of a 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
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The wording of Resolutions 1154 and 1205 makes it clear that the Security Council 
has not authorised the use of armed force. The Security Council did not repeat the 
phrasing in Resolution 678, which states that "all necessary means" be used. The usage 
of the phrase "severest consequences" is not an authorisation for Member States, but it 
rather serves as a warning for Iraq. During discussions in the Security Council 
following Operation Desert Fox99 it was clear that the majority of Member States did 
not view Resolution 1205 as implicitly reviving the authority to use force in Resolution 
678.100
Resolution 1441 is the latest resolution that contains extensive provisions regarding the 
weapons inspection regime.
 To allow members to act in terms of implied authorisation included in Security 
Council Resolutions would furthermore lead to the abuse of these resolutions. Member 
States may therefore declare that they are acting in terms of an implicit authorisation 
in order to promote self-interest. This would create legal uncertainty and would 
furthermore lead to the abuse of chapter VII. Accepting an implicit authorisation for 
the use of force would amount to a contravention of one of the main objectives of the 
UN Charter, which is the promotion of peace.  
101 This resolution does not contain an authorisation of the 
use of force against Iraq even when the latter does not comply with the obligations of 
the Resolution.102 The wording of the resolution is to the effect that although it is 
recognized that Iraq is in material breach of its obligations, it is still the Security 
Council that needs to decide what the appropriate answer to this breach will be.103
                                                 
99  The USA and UK instituted Operation Desert Fox in 1998 in response to fact that Iraq did not co-
operate with UN weapon inspectors. 
100  Gray 2002 EJIL 12. This issue was also debated after the UK and USA attacked Iraq radar 
installations and command centres in February 2001. Russia, China and France viewed these strikes as 
illegal.  
101  Par ; Security Council Resolution 1441 of 2002.  
102  Par 1 states that Iraq is and has been in breach of previous resolutions, which includes Resolution 687. 
Par 13 refers to the fact that Iraq has been warned of the serious consequences it faces due to the 
violation of its obligations.  
103  Par 14 states that the Security Council "remain seized of the matter".  
 This 
resolution, just as the others, therefore does not serve as a legal basis for the attack on 
Iraq. The USA and UK therefore attacked Iraq without authorisation from the Security 
Council.  
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5.2  The pre-emptive use of force 
The plan to attack Iraq was primarily based on the argument of the USA that Iraq has 
continued the development of weapons of mass destruction and might use these 
weapons against opponents or supply these weapons to terrorist networks.104 The 
objective was to pre-empt this danger by removing the regime from power. This 
strategy is therefore based on the concept of pre-emptive self-defence.105 Is this 
doctrine in line with article 51 of the UN Charter? In terms of the wording of article 
51 the element of armed attack must be present to invoke the notion of self-defence. 
This is supported by the ruling in the Nicaragua case that the right to self-defence 
exists only in the instance of an armed attack.106
The Parties in this case did not rely on the issue of a threat of an imminent armed 
attack and the court therefore did not rule on this issue.
 The court indicated that an armed 
attack does not only refer to action by regular forces across an international border, but 
may also include:  
[T]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to … an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces. 
107
The Caroline case has been widely cited to answer this issue. This case has commonly 
been accepted as indicating when the customary law of self-defence can be invoked. In 
terms of this case anticipatory self-defence is permitted when it can be shown that a 
"necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation" exists.
 The question whether 
anticipatory self-defence will be lawful was therefore never addressed. The point in 
time from which measures of self-defence against an armed attack may be taken 
remains unclear.  
108
                                                 
104  O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 12 Aug. 
 This case, however, represented the customary law 
prior to the existence of the Charter and it is unclear whether article 51 precludes the 
105  President Bush referred to pre-emption at a Graduation Speech at West Point in May 2002. To be 
found at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/06/20020601-3.html 2 Jun. This concept 
has also been included in the National Security Strategy of the USA of September 2002. To be found 
at: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf  3 Jun.  
106  Par 194-195, 211; Nicaragua case.  
107  Par 194. 
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customary law in this regard and therefore precludes a right to anticipatory self-
defence. This uncertainty stems from the inclusion of the term "inherent" in article 51. 
The prevailing view (and in the opinion of the author, correct view) is that, taking 
account of the objective of the Charter, article 51 excludes any self-defence other than 
that being launched in response to an armed attack.109 It must be kept in mind that the 
customary right of self-defence is unclear and that its existence could even extend to 
the unilateral use of force by countries. The term "inherent" rather implies that the 
right of self-defence is also available to non-UN members. Disagreement exists 
amongst international lawyers regarding the point in time from which self-defence 
may be invoked.110 The more correct view is that anticipatory self-defence is not 
recognized by article 51. The recognition of this doctrine may result in abuse as the 
requirements of this principle are vague and may be left to the discretion of States, 
which will easily justify their actions as anticipatory. Although this issue is of interest 
in relation to the law of force, it is not of much relevance regarding the Bush doctrine 
of pre-emptive force. This doctrine entails a right of self-defence for possible or 
potential threats that may occur in the future. Even the acceptance of a right to 
anticipatory self-defence based on the requirements of the Caroline case will not 
justify a right to pre-emptive defence. Pre-emptive defence relates to a hypothetical 
potential threat, which has not occurred or has not begun to occur. This scenario 
clearly exceeds the criteria of the Caroline case. The doctrine of pre-emptive strike is 
not recognized in terms of international public law and contravenes article 2(4).111
The pre-emptive strike doctrine is nothing more than offensive measures in disguise 
and does not adhere to the requirements of self-defence. Anarchy will be the result 
where other states follow the lead (and the doctrine) of the USA. States may decide 
that they do not trust other states which they regard as enemies and therefore invoke 
pre-emptive defence. This will undermine the international regime and will lead to a 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
108  Harris International Law 848.  
109  Randelzhofer The Charter 792. Brownlie also cautions against using the Caroline incident in isolation 
due to the fact that it relates to a period before the modern legal regime. Brownlie Rule of Law 203. 
110  See for various opinions: Harris International Law 849-851. O'Connel is of the opinion that 
anticipatory self-defence is allowed in terms of international law where it is in response to incipient 
attacks and ongoing campaigns. O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 8 and 11. She is 
of the opinion that: "a state need not wait to suffer the actual blow before defending itself, so long as it 
is certain the blow is coming". Concurring, Murswiek 2003 NJW 1016-1018.  
111  This statement is supported by O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf and Murswiek 
2003 NJW 1018.  
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situation where force is an accepted mechanism of regulating international affairs. 
This was the view that was generally accepted by international lawyers in the 
nineteenth century when the distinction between bellum justum and bellum injustum 
was irrelevant.112
… brought the theory of law into accord with what had always been and still 
remained the facts of international practice."
 The opinion exists that this acceptance:  
113
This statement came back to hunt international lawyers in the twenty first century due 
to the illegal invasion of Iraq by the USA. It seems that the theory of law has been 
brought into accord with the practice that the superpower will act in disregard of the 
international regime. It is, however, clear that it does not want other states to enjoy the 
same rights. Historically, the USA has argued against a right of pre-emptive self-
defence and played a leading role in the adoption of the UN Charter.
 
114
… when and where it chooses, but the nation will also punish those who engage 
in terror and aggression and will work to impose a universal moral clarity 
between good and evil."
 The reason for 
the position of the USA was that although the Charter rules can restrict the USA, it is 
worthwhile due to the fact that it restricts other states as well. It is clearly not in the 
interest of the USA if states invoke pre-emptive self-defence in order to attack other 
states.  
The USA has decreed a new doctrine through its acts where it may not only choose to 
impose pre-emptive force: 
115
This pre-emptive defence will ultimately be employed to enforce good. These criteria 
are clearly vague. What is good and who has the competence to decide on this matter? 
The USA will ultimately decide what universal good entails. It has been argued that a 
situation may arise where a sui generis set of rules pertain to the USA and another set 
of rules apply to other states.
 
116
                                                 
112  Randelzhofer The Charter 114. 
113  Harris International Law 817.  
 The acceptance of this line of argument once again 
reflects the view of a "supposed realist". The mere fact that the USA is acting as if a 
114  O'Connel http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf 16.  
115  Graduation speech of George W Bush at West Point in May 2002.  
116  Byers 2002 EJIL 38.  
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sui generis set of rules applies, does not mean that this violation of international law 
should be condoned by giving this non-adherence legal status. The role of domination 
that the USA plays is not a basis for the creation of new rules pertaining to the 
formation of customary law. Realistic and unacceptable practice should be 
distinguished from what the law prescribes. The notion of a set of sui generis rules 
violates the principle of sovereign equality. Has this principle also been rewritten by 
the actions of the USA?117 This is clearly not the case.118
This article explored three instances where primarily the USA and UK used force against 
other states during the past ten years. The purpose of this investigation is to examine the 
legality of the coercive measures in order to ascertain the effects that these actions had in 
relation to article 2(4) of the Charter. The proposed justifications for the attacks differ. In 
the instance of the use of armed force in Kosovo, the concept of humanitarian 
intervention was used as a ground for justification.
 No doubt can therefore exist 
that the attack on Iraq was in contravention of article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
 
6  Conclusion 
119
                                                 
117  A 2(1) of the Charter. 
118  The Charter cannot be easily amended. In terms of a 103 the Charter for instance overrides all 
inconsistent treaties regardless of the date of their entry into force. A 108 of the Charter states that an 
amendment will come into force when it has been adopted by two thirds of the members of the 
General Assembly and ratified in terms of their constitutional processes by two thirds of the members 
of the UN, which must include all the permanent members of the Security Council.  
119  It must be noted that he USA did not rely on the notion of humanitarian intervention to justify its 
actions, but it rather stressed political and moral considerations in this regard. The concept of 
humanitarian intervention is something, which authors of international public law have focused on. In 
the pending case before the ICJ, the Legality of the Use of Force, the defendant states did not rely on 
the concept of humanitarian intervention. Only Belgium referred to past practice regarding 
humanitarian intervention.  
 The attack on Afghanistan was in 
response to the terrorist attacks that were launched against the USA during 2001. The use 
of force in Iraq was mainly based on the doctrine of pre-emptive force. The reaction of 
the international community also differed in relation to these actions. The international 
community mostly granted support to the armed interventions that took place in Kosovo 
and Afghanistan, while the attack on Iraq was met by international resistance. These 
actions were more readily accepted by states in the instance of Kosovo due to the 
multilateral nature of the armed intervention as well as the moral compelling reasons to 
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intervene. The gravity of the terrorist attacks in 2001 also contributed to the support that 
the USA received for its attack against Afghanistan. The attack on Iraq was against the 
wishes of the majority of the states of the world. The actions of the USA indicate that it 
may not perceive the jus ad bellum to be binding and accordingly finds it unnecessary to 
engage in lengthy arguments to justify its actions. This is the result of the developments 
that took place especially during the past decade. The development of the notion of 
humanitarian intervention is a reaction to the atrocities committed in contravention of 
human rights and for which the Charter does not provide an adequate response. The 
doctrine of pre-emptive force is also an apology of power for the actions of the USA. The 
attacks against Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks are also debatable. 
The commonality that exists between the three cases, is the illegality attached to the 
actions of primarily the USA and the UK.  
The failure of the Security Council to preserve peace implies that the United Nations has 
failed in the realization of one of its main objectives. The question is whether a solution 
could be found to ensure that the Security Council would be able to preserve peace? The 
way in which the Security Council needs to rely on the armed forces of members in order 
to deter aggression is the main source of the problem. This model may have opened the 
door for the abusive use of coercive measures by members of the Security Council. This 
was the case in Iraq in 2003 where certain members have subsequently illegally attacked 
Iraq on the basis of Resolution 678. This may have been different if the Security Council 
had troops at its disposal as envisaged in article 43 of the UN Charter. The Security 
Council would have direct command over the armed forces. Members that acted 
independently would then not be able to hide behind an implicit authorization in a 
resolution. It would therefore be logical to propose that article 43 must be adhered to. 
Article 43 has never been utilized and it is not envisaged that it would ever become 
operational.  
This would, however, not address the way in which article 27(3) determines the voting 
procedure of the Security Council, which makes provision for the right of a veto for a 
permanent member. This seems to be the main reason for members of the Security 
Council to act in the absence of authorization. The availability of armed forces to the 
Security Council would not solve this problem. It is most probable that the deployment of 
such a force would have been vetoed in the Kosovo case. This would also not have 
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avoided the unilateral attack on Iraq, due to the lack of support for this action in the 
Security Council. The problem must be addressed at its source. Members can agree to an 
amendment of article 27 of the UN Charter, which will ensure a more efficient 
mechanism that could respond to threats of international peace. It is, however, the 
opinion of the author that this would also not be an optimal solution.120
                                                 
120  It is therefore not worthwhile to investigate and propose an amendment. The strict requirements for 
amendment of the Charter, makes it doubtful whether such a proposal would even succeed.  
 Article 27 
contains cumbersome provisions for a very good reason and that is to ensure that the 
object of ensuring international peace is not disturbed. This provision creates a system, 
which ensures that members of the Security Council does not abuse this mechanism to 
employ armed force against other States. It is clear from the objectives of the UN Charter 
and article 2(4) that the deployment of armed forces authorized by the Security Council 
cannot be easily undertaken. An amendment of article 27 would allow members of the 
Security Council to use the council to endorse its unilateral armed operations. This would 
frustrate the realization of international peace.  
This statement suggests that it does not seem that the Security Council will be successful 
in curtailing the illegal acts of major powers, such as the USA. This does not imply that 
article 2(4) is irrelevant. States should continue to support the jus ad bellum and should 
not accept actions that contravene this provision. It is not perfect, but it is the only 
measure that can preclude anarchy relating to the use of force in the international arena. 
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